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Ownership Influence and CSR Disclosure in China 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose – This study examines the relationship between ownership type and the likelihood 
of publication of a corporate social responsibility (CSR) report. 
Design/methodology/approach – Drawing on stakeholder salience theory, the Probit model 
is employed for a sample of 1,839 Chinese listed firms to study how different types of owners 
influence firm CSR engagement. 
Findings – The analysis reveals that the Chinese stock exchanges exert a positive influence 
on the likelihood of a firm producing a CSR report, an effect which is more significant in 
state owned enterprises (SOEs). Foreign investors lead to a greater likelihood of publication 
of a CSR report, though this effect is weaker in SOEs. In contrast, the holdings of state and 
domestic institutional investors are broadly neutral.  
Practical implications – The study helps corporate managers to recognise how particular 
types of shareholders will value their efforts regarding CSR activities and disclosure, and also 
assists policy makers in improving the level of CSR disclosure through the development of 
new policy. 
Social implications – Apposite CSR disclosure enhances trust and facilitates the shared 
values on which to build a more cohesive society. 
Originality/value – The novelty of this study is that it addresses the effect of institutional 
investors on Chinese firm CSR engagement and thus provides an important insight for firms, 
investors, and other stakeholders into the interplay of portfolio investment and CSR. 
 
Key words: CSR, foreign investors, institutional investors, SOEs, stakeholder salience theory, 
stock exchange 
 
Paper type: Research paper 
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Ownership Influence and CSR Disclosure in China 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure may be influenced by the motives and 
values of an organisation’s shareholders. However, the precise effect of shareholders on CSR 
is far from clear (Neubaum & Zahra, 2006), with existing studies focusing on the 
examination of the impact of institutional investors in a US or European setting (i.e. Cox et 
al., 2004; Johnson & Greening, 1999; Neubaum & Zahra, 2006; Dam & Scholtens, 2012). 
Somewhat less attention is focused on emerging markets regarding how various types of 
shareholders relate to CSR disclosure (Khan et al., 2013).  
   In a Chinese setting, existing CSR studies have investigated the impact of companies being 
state-owned or otherwise on the likelihood of CSR disclosure (e.g. Li et al., 2013 & 2016; 
Marquis & Qian, 2014). Despite the greatly increased prevalence of institutional investor 
ownership in China, its impact is still unexplored. Given the very different economic setting, 
it is uncertain whether the relationship between CSR disclosure and institutional ownership 
documented for developed nations will apply readily to Chinese companies. This paper thus 
seeks to fill the research gap by examining the relationship between Chinese firm CSR 
engagement and ownership structure, by determining the impact not only of state ownership, 
but also the impact of institutional investors and foreign investors.  
   Drawing on stakeholder salience theory, we argue that the more stakeholder attributes 
(power, legitimacy and urgency) a stakeholder embodies, the greater its influence will be on a 
firm’s decision to issue a CSR report. We find that the Chinese stock exchanges exert a 
positive influence on the likelihood of a firm producing a CSR report, and such influence is 
more significant in SOEs. In contrast, the holdings of state and domestic institutional 
investors are broadly neutral. Foreign investors exert a positive impact on the likelihood of 
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issuing a CSR report, though this relationship is moderated by the presence of state 
ownership.  
   This paper makes several contributions. First, it adds to the emerging literature on CSR 
practices by providing empirical evidence on the CSR-shareholder relationship in China, 
while much of the existing literature is limited to examining the relation between CSR and 
financial performance or corporate governance. Second, while prior studies tend to focus 
exclusively on state ownership, this is the first study of the effect of different institutional 
investors on CSR disclosure and corporate governance in China. We account for investment 
horizon heterogeneity across institutional investors due to differences in their scale, role and 
societal position. Understanding the impact of shareholder type on CSR disclosure should 
offer an important insight for firms, investors, and other stakeholders into the interplay of 
portfolio investment and CSR (Dam & Scholtens, 2012). Our results may be used to help 
promote the CSR agenda and increase the level of CSR disclosure in Chinese listed firms. 
Finally, our study extends the transition economy CSR literature by examining ownership 
type.  
   The remainder of our paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the salient 
literature on CSR in China. Section 3 discusses the use of stakeholder salience theory as the 
theoretical framework for our study, and then proceeds to formulate the hypotheses. Section 4 
outlines our research design. The results are then presented in Section 5, and discussed 
further in Section 6. Section 7 sets out our conclusions and the implications and limitations of 
the research. 
 
2. CSR DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 
It was not until 2006 that CSR was explicitly recognised in Company Law in China. In that 
year, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) issued the Guide on the Social Responsibility of 
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Listed Companies, followed by a Circular published by the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) 
in 2008. In the same year, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission issued the CSR Guideline for Central Government Controlled SOEs requiring 
them to publish CSR reports within three years of the issued guideline. Meanwhile, the 
Ministry of Commerce released the Guide on Implementation of CSR in 2008 to promote 
social responsibility in foreign-funded enterprises. Despite government endorsement of CSR, 
implementation of the guidelines was far from effective due to their lack of clarity (Hu & 
Karbhari, 2015). 
   Existing CSR studies for China are mainly concerned with examining the level and 
determinants of the CSR disclosure decision, including the influence of political connection 
(Marquis & Qian, 2014) and financial performance (Li et al., 2013), and the coverage of the 
CSR report. Few studies directly examine the relationship between ownership type and CSR 
disclosure exclusively for state ownership. Lau et al. (2016) and Li et al. (2016) find that 
CSR disclosure is positively associated with state ownership, while no such relationship is 
found by Li et al. (2013) and Marquis and Qian (2014). These studies neither examine the 
effect of foreign or institutional investors on Chinese firm CSR engagement, nor do they 
address the impact of CSR initiatives by government agencies (such as the two stock 
exchanges) on CSR disclosure, the sole exception being Marquis and Qian (2014). Our study, 
however, differs from Marquis and Qian in two ways. First, we examine the effects of a 
variety of ownership types on firm CSR disclosure by employing stakeholder salience theory 
in contrast to the political legitimacy perspective employed by the authors. Second, we study 
how the effect of CSR initiatives by the two Chinese stock exchanges on the CSR reporting 
decision differs between SOEs and non-SOEs. 
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3. STAKEHOLDER SALIENCE THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Freeman (1984, p.46) defines stakeholders as “any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives”, but fails to address the 
prioritisation of stakeholder claims. To identify stakeholder relevance, Mitchell et al. (1997) 
propose the stakeholder salience theory. They define salience as “the degree to which 
managers give priority to competing stakeholder claims” (p.854), which is positively related 
to the stakeholder’s power to influence the firm, the legitimacy of the stakeholder’s 
relationship with the firm, and the urgency of the stakeholder’s claim on the firm. The more 
attributes managers assess as strong, the higher the salience of a particular stakeholder. The 
stakeholder salience model is dynamic because the attributes can change for any particular 
entity or stakeholder-manager relationship and are not objective as they are based on 
management perception. Further, the stakeholders may or may not be aware that they possess 
a particular attribute or may not be willing or wish to act on that attribute. Drawing on 
stakeholder salience theory, we argue that the more powerful and vocal the shareholders, the 
greater their influence on a firm’s decision to produce a CSR report.  
 
3.1. State ownership 
Nearly 60% of Chinese listed firms are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Li et al., 2013), 
giving state owners important voting rights on key corporate decisions (Chen et al., 2009) 
and providing them with greater power, legitimacy and influence over firm objectives, 
including firm support for CSR initiatives. The inherent political tie enables SOEs to enjoy 
financial and regulatory favour (Wu et al., 2012), but also pressures them to pursue political 
and strategic goals in addition to profit maximising.  
   Existing studies on the effect of state holdings on the CSR reporting decision provide little 
empirical evidence in a developed nation setting (Van der Zee, 2012; Dam & Scholtens, 
Page 5 of 26 Accounting Research Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Accounting Research Journal
6 
 
2012). Research in a Chinese corporate setting has proved inconclusive. Some studies find 
that CSR disclosure is positively related to state ownership (Lau et al., 2016; Li et al., 2016). 
However, Li et al. (2013) and Marquis and Qian (2014) find no such relationship. The 
government, as the paramount shareholder, provides critical resources and legitimacy to 
Chinese SOEs which are important to their continued viability and success. Stakeholder 
salience theory suggests that large state holdings can wield influence over firm managers’ 
decisions. Therefore, SOE managers attend to the demands of powerful state owners and 
prioritise their social interests more than other firms. We thus hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: SOEs are more likely to issue CSR reports than non-SOEs.   
 
   Li et al. (2013) argue that SOEs and non-SOEs have different priorities in stakeholder 
management. Non-SOEs focus on profit maximisation while SOEs tend to have wider 
strategic and political objectives (Wu et al., 2016), causing them to engage in and report upon 
socially responsible activities as a result of pressure from their government owners. In 
addition, the CSR Guide and Circular issued by the two stock exchanges place a demand of 
legitimacy and urgency on SOEs disclosing CSR information. The combined pressure from 
the state owner and the two stock exchanges strengthens the imperative of their CSR 
demands to SOE executives. Consistent with stakeholder salience theory, when two or more 
stakeholders join forces to communicate their respective positions on CSR issues, they are 
likely to increase their impact. We argue that SOE managers are more likely to respond to 
CSR disclosure demands from state owners and the two stock exchanges in order to maintain 
their legitimacy. We thus hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: Where required to publish CSR reports by the two stock exchanges, 
SOEs are more likely to issue CSR reports than non-SOEs. 
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3.2. Institutional investors 
Institutional investors have come under increasing pressure to account for social performance 
in their portfolios (Cox et al., 2004) in the hope of differentiating their services and to 
demonstrate their reliability and responsibility (Siegel & Vitaliano, 2007). However, 
institutional investors differ in their orientation towards the firm’s social investments. Blair 
(1995) finds that institutional owner investment horizons influence their behaviour and 
incentives, arising from their different mandates and divergent stakeholder expectations. 
Stakeholder salience theory suggests that the CSR demands of short-term institutional 
investors may not be viewed as paramount compared to those of long-term institutional 
investors due to their limited influence on firm management (Neubaum & Zahra, 2006). We 
segment institutional ownership by investment horizon to examine whether firm decisions to 
issue a CSR report are related to short-term investments, including domestic mutual funds 
and insurance companies, or longer-term investments, the National Social Security Fund 
(NSSF), and the qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs). 
Short-term institutional owners 
Mutual funds in China are subject to the scrutiny of regulators, investors and the public, are 
required to make quarterly portfolio disclosures, and must follow mandated investment styles 
(National People’s Congress, 2003), leading to an extremely high turnover rate. Such short-
termism is inconsistent with CSR objectives which are inherently long-term (Graves & 
Waddock, 1994). It was not until 2007 that Chinese insurers were allowed to invest up to 10% 
of their total assets in A-shares (stock exchange listed) directly and an additional 10% in 
shares indirectly through mutual funds (Aggarwal et al., 2015). To seek higher investment 
yields, they engaged in significant short term stock trading (Huang et al., 2016).  
   Prior studies evidence mixed results on the effect of short-term institutional ownership on 
CSR performance. Neubaum and Zahra (2006) find such owners are less likely to focus on 
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firm social performance, though Johnson and Greening (1999) and Cox et al. (2004) find no 
evidence of this. To date, no studies have examined how investment by mutual funds and 
insurance companies affects firm CSR disclosure in China. Given their transient focus, 
stakeholder salience theory suggests that the CSR expectations of short-term institutional 
investors will not receive as much management attention as those of long-term institutions. 
Because the former are solely focused on a financial investment relationship with an investee, 
CSR activity may be merely seen as a costly activity. We therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: The degree of short-term institutional stock ownership (e.g. mutual 
funds and insurance companies) is negatively associated with the probability of firms 
issuing CSR reports.  
 
Long-term institutional investors 
Stakeholder salience theory suggests that a long-term investment horizon enables long-term 
institutional investors to establish effective and sustainable relationships with investee firms, 
thus increasing their salience to firm managers and gaining manager support for CSR 
disclosure (Neubaum & Zahra, 2006). Long-term institutional owners are more likely to 
invest in firms with good social performance due to its potentially favourable impact on long-
run risk and return (Graves & Waddock, 1994).  
   The Chinese public pension fund, the NSSF, established in 2000, began investing in the 
stock markets in 2003. Since then the NSSF has become the largest institutional investor in 
China (Leckie & Pan, 2007). The NSSF supports investment in long-term activities, 
consistent with a commitment to CSR. Drawing on stakeholder salience theory, the size and 
enduring focus of long-term institutional holdings can change firm management priorities and 
decisions, lending such investors more authority. Despite the lack of empirical research on 
the NSSF and CSR in China, the broad literature consensus suggests that such pension funds 
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positively promote firm CSR disclosure (Johnson & Greening, 1999; Neubaum & Zahra, 
2006). Thus, we state the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The degree of NSSF ownership is positively associated with the 
likelihood of a firm issuing a CSR report. 
 
3.3. QFIIs 
QFIIs may empower firms to promote CSR disclosure for the following reasons. First, QFIIs 
are subject to a strict approval process to vet new entrants (Huang & Zhu, 2015), confirming 
that they maintain long-term investment philosophies (CSRC, 2013). Stakeholder salience 
theory suggests that executives will pay more attention to the preferences of long-term 
institutional owners. Second, despite QFII holdings accounting for only 1% of Chinese stocks, 
their influence is important as they are more inclined to ‘exercise their voice’ rather than exit 
(Huang & Zhu, 2015), consistent with stakeholder salience theory which argues that vocal 
stakeholders are likely to have a greater influence on firm strategy. In addition, the increasing 
significance of foreign financing of Chinese stocks highlights the importance of QFII 
demands in the minds of investee firm managers, making a CSR disclosure request more 
compelling. We therefore state the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: The degree of QFII ownership is positively associated with the 
likelihood of a firm issuing a CSR report.  
 
   Wu et al. (2016) find that in weaker legal environments, institutional investors may have 
fewer channels to effectively monitor firm activities, and this may affect the process of 
stakeholder prioritisation. Given the unique institutional features and weak legal environment 
in China (Fan et al., 2013), we propose that the influence of foreign ownership on CSR 
disclosure is moderated by the presence of state ownership as the latter reduces reliance on 
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external capital market funding, and may weaken foreign ownership pressure to engage in 
CSR activities. Senior managers must balance competing expectations, determining which 
stakeholders are salient and therefore should receive management attention (Neubaum & 
Zahra, 2006). We argue that foreign ownership demand for CSR disclosure may be 
moderated by state co-owners who enjoy greater power, legitimacy and urgency over listed 
firms. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: There is a weaker association between the degree of QFII ownership 
and the likelihood of a firm issuing a CSR reports in SOEs than is the case in non-
SOEs.  
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Our sample consists of all publicly traded Chinese firms listed on the SSE and SZSE for the 
year 2010, the first and only year that CSR ratings were disclosed for all Chinese firms by the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Corporate Social Responsibility Research Centre 
(CASS-CSR). We obtain the CSR data from the Whitepaper on Chinese firms’ CSR by the 
CASS-CSR (2011), the financial and ownership data from the China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research database, and the list of firms required to issue CSR reports from the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, respectively. After removing firms with missing 
data, financial firms, and those in special treatment, our final sample consists of 1,839 firms, 
of which 459 published CSR reports.  
   Table 1 reports the number of firms issuing CSR reports by industry class where more than 
half of the CSR reports issued were by manufacturing firms. The mean percentage of 
published CSR reports across all industries is 25%, with the highest percentage of 49% for 
the mining industry.  
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
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4.1. The dependent variable – CSR report 
CSR report is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the firm issued a CSR report in 2010, 
and 0 otherwise, according to the CASS-CSR data.  
 
4.2. Shareholder variables 
Shareholder variables include state control, institutional ownership, and foreign ownership. 
State control is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is ultimately controlled by 
the state, and 0 otherwise. To ensure this variable reflects the nature of the ultimate controller 
of a firm, we measure control consistent with La Porta et al. (1999). Institutional ownership 
has three types: (i) mutual fund ownership – the proportion of shares owned by Chinese 
mutual funds; (ii) insurance ownership – the proportion of shares owned by Chinese 
insurance companies; and (iii) NSSF ownership – the proportion of shares owned by the 
NSSF. Finally, foreign ownership is the proportion of shares owned by QFIIs.  
 
4.3. Control variables  
We include control variables to account for industry and firm characteristics. We compute the 
logarithm of total assets to gauge firm size and employ the return on assets (ROA) to measure 
firm financial performance, both of which have a positive effect on CSR disclosure (Orlitzky, 
2001; Li et al., 2013). Firm leverage, measured as total liabilities to total assets, is used to 
gauge the influence of creditor power on CSR disclosure (Roberts, 1992). Furthermore, we 
employ the Zeno index (Z-index) to gauge ownership concentration, consistent with Liu et al. 
(2014), and calculated as the number of shares owned by the largest shareholder deflated by 
the number of shares owned by the second largest shareholder. Sixteen industry dummies are 
created as Dam and Scholtens (2012) find industry has a significant influence on CSR. We 
use CSRC industry codes, with diversified industries as the reference category. We use a 
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stock exchange dummy to distinguish the firms listed in the SSE from those in the SZSE, 
with listing on the SZSE as the reference category. Finally, we include a required discloser 
dummy variable to equal 1 if a firm is required by either the SSE or the SZSE to issue a CSR 
report, and 0 otherwise.1 
   As the dependent variable is a binary variable, we employ the Probit model to explain the 
likelihood of a firm issuing a CSR report. The specification for the baseline model is given in 
equation (1). 
)(FOREIGNNSSFINSURMFSOE
SESSEOWNCONLEVERAGEROASIZECSRRP
iiiiii
iiiiiii
11110987
6543210
εβββββ
βββββββ
++++++
++++++=
 
where CSRRP is the dichotomous variable measuring the presence of a CSR report for firm i, 
SIZE is the logarithm of total assets, ROA is return on assets, LEVERAGE is measured as total 
liabilities deflated by total assets, OWNCON measures ownership concentration, SSE is the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange dummy, SE is a dummy variable for stock exchange required 
discloser, SOE is the state owned enterprise dummy, MF is the percentage of shares owned 
by mutual funds, INSUR is the percentage of shares owned by insurance companies, NSSF is 
the percentage of shares owned by the NSSF, FOREIGN is the percentage of shares owned 
by QFIIs, β0 is the intercept, and εi is the model error.   
   The specification for the full model including the interaction terms is given in equation (2). 
)(FOREIGNSOESESOE
FOREIGNNSSFINSURMFSOESE
SSEOWNCONLEVERAGEROASIZECSRRP
iiiii
iiiiii
iiiiii
21312
11109876
543210
εββ
ββββββ
ββββββ
+×+×+
++++++
+++++=
  
where the interaction term SOE×SE tests hypothesis 2 and the interaction term 
SOE×FOREIGN tests hypothesis 6.  
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5. RESULTS 
5.1. Descriptive analysis  
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for our model variables. In 
total, 25% of firms issued a CSR report and 50% are controlled by the state. Mutual fund 
investors are the biggest institutional investors, on average holding 3.32% of the shares 
outstanding.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
5.2. The CSR models 
Table 3 presents the results of seven specifications of the model explaining the likelihood of a 
firm issuing a CSR report. Model 1 presents results for the control variables. Firm size and 
financial performance are positively related to the likelihood of a firm publishing a CSR 
report, consistent with the existing literature (Waddock & Graves, 1997). Large firms are 
more likely to issue CSR reports because of their greater public visibility. Profitable firms 
enjoy more organisational slack, thus are more likely to invest in CSR activities. Higher 
ownership concentration reduces the likelihood of a firm publishing a CSR report, consistent 
with the existing literature (Roberts, 1992). Firms required by the two stock exchanges to 
publish CSR reports are more likely to provide such a report. However, none of the industry 
dummies are significant, suggesting that industry membership does not impact upon the 
likelihood of a firm issuing a CSR report.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
   Models 2 to 7 test the hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 states that SOEs are more likely to issue 
CSR reports than non-SOEs. In Model 2, the coefficient of state control is positive but 
insignificant and therefore hypothesis 1 is not supported. In Model 3, the interaction term 
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between state control and stock exchange is positive and significant at the 5% level, 
supporting hypothesis 2, which states that where required to publish CSR reports by the two 
stock exchanges, SOEs are more likely to issue CSR reports than non-SOEs.  
   Hypothesis 3 states that the degree of short-term institutional stock ownership is negatively 
associated with the probability of firms issuing CSR reports. In Model 4, the coefficient for 
mutual fund ownership is positive but insignificant, and the coefficient for insurance 
ownership is negative and significant at the 10% level, offering weak support for hypothesis 
3. Hypothesis 4 states that the extent of NSSF ownership is positively associated with the 
presence of a CSR report. The coefficient of NSSF is positive but insignificant, and thus 
hypothesis 4 is not supported.  
   Hypothesis 5 states that the degree of QFII (foreign) ownership is positively associated with 
the likelihood of a firm issuing a CSR report. In Model 5, the coefficient for foreign 
ownership is positive and significant at the 10% level, offering weak support for hypothesis 5. 
Hypothesis 6 states that there is a weaker association between the degree of QFII ownership 
and the presence of a CSR report in SOEs than is the case in non-SOEs. In Model 6, the 
coefficient of the interaction term between foreign ownership and state control is negative 
and significant at the 5% level, thereby supporting hypothesis 6. Model 7 includes all 
shareholder variables and the results are consistent with those of the reduced form models.2  
   Two tests are conducted to check the robustness of the results. First, for all models, we 
replace the Z-index with the ownership percentage of the largest shareholder to measure 
ownership concentration. Second, in Models 5 and 6, we replace shares by foreign investors 
with a binary variable measuring whether or not a firm has foreign investors. The unreported 
results suggest that the findings regarding ownership concentration and foreign investment 
are robust.  
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6. DISCUSSION 
6.1. The effect of the state and the stock exchanges on CSR disclosure 
Our results show that firms under state control are not more likely to publish CSR reports 
than privately controlled firms, consistent with Marquis and Qian (2014) and Dam and 
Scholtens (2012). However, SOEs are more likely to issue CSR reports than non-SOEs where 
required to publish CSR reports by the two stock exchanges. These findings can be explained 
by stakeholder salience theory. First, although the Chinese state is clearly a powerful and 
legitimate stakeholder of the firms in which it has controlling shares, and promoting CSR is 
one of its social objectives, its demand for managers to publish CSR reports lacks urgency. 
Mitchell et al. (1997) argue that for stakeholders to achieve salience to firm managers, they 
must have either power to enforce their will or their claim should be perceived as urgent. Our 
results contrast with the study by Lau et al. (2016) who report a positive relationship, though 
this may be attributed to their use of the percentage of shares owned by the state as the 
measure of state control.   
   Second, the stock exchanges strengthen the salience of the CSR demand of state owners. 
Mitchell et al. (1997) argue that dominant stakeholders (e.g. state owners) with power and 
legitimacy may become salient if their legitimate stake becomes urgent, and therefore earn 
the manager’s immediate priority. When the specific requirement from the stock exchanges 
for a CSR report is absent, managers appear not to treat the state owner’s demand for CSR 
reports as their top priority. However, when a firm is required by the stock exchanges to 
publish a CSR report, the state owner’s demand suddenly becomes urgent; thus, the managers 
of these firms are more likely to comply than is the case for privately controlled firms.  
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6.2. The effect of institutional investors on CSR disclosure  
Our results show that short-term institutional investors have no impact on the likelihood of 
firm CSR disclosure, consistent with findings for developed countries such as in Johnson and 
Greening (1999), Neubaum and Zahra (2006) and Cox et al. (2004). The short-termism of 
Chinese mutual funds and insurance companies discussed in the extant literature is 
inconsistent with the objectives of CSR, and thus funds earn less salience in their relationship 
with firm managers. 
   We find that NSSF ownership has no direct impact on the likelihood of CSR disclosure. 
This is somewhat surprising as numerous studies for other countries document a positive 
relation (Johnson & Greening, 1999; Cox et al. 2004; Oh et al. 2011). Our results may be 
explained by the potential corporate governance shortcomings of the NSSF itself. According 
to Leckie and Pan (2007), the NSSF has no clearly defined objectives and purposes, no 
external independent director on the board, and the extremely abbreviated annual reports are 
not audited. These factors could lead to its long-term strategic goals and priorities being 
compromised, and thus the NSSF may not in effect behave as a long-term investor.  
 
6.3. The effect of foreign investors on CSR disclosure  
We find that holdings by QFIIs (foreign investors) exert a positive impact on the probability 
of firm CSR disclosure, consistent with other emerging market empirical studies (e.g. Oh et 
al., 2011; Khan et al., 2013). The QFIIs are principally large institutional investors with long-
term investment philosophies, meaning they enjoy greater salience in their relationship with 
executives; thus, their CSR demands are more likely to be met. Furthermore, the QFIIs are 
more vocal than domestic institutional investors, therefore intensifying their salience in the 
minds of managers (Huang & Zhu, 2015). In addition, we find that the positive relation 
between the QFIIs and the likelihood of CSR disclosure is weakened considerably across 
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firms controlled by the state. This may be because SOEs have more available resources, and 
as a result pay less attention to minority shareholders such as QFIIs, thus reducing their 
salience to managers.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
Drawing upon stakeholder salience theory, this paper examines the impact of different types 
of ownership on the likelihood of CSR disclosure in Chinese listed firms. The results 
highlight that where firms are required to disclose by the stock exchanges, the likelihood of 
issuing CSR reports is higher in SOEs than in non-SOEs. The results also suggest that foreign 
ownership has a positive impact on the presence of CSR reports, though this effect is weaker 
in SOEs.  
   Our study also provides several unexpected yet insightful results. First, no significant 
relationship is found between state ownership and the likelihood of CSR disclosure, 
confirming existing studies (e.g. Dam & Scholtens, 2012). We argue that SOEs have the least 
need to use CSR disclosure to seek preferred status due to their inherent political legitimacy. 
Second, insurance company ownership exerts a negative impact on the likelihood of CSR 
disclosure, suggesting that they perceive producing a CSR report as merely a short-term cost.  
   Our study has important implications for both policy and society. The results reveal that the 
issue of varying CSR guidelines by different authorities may have led to inconsistent 
disclosure practices across firms. To enhance the quantity and quality of CSR disclosure, the 
Chinese government should provide more detailed guidance in terms of required CSR report 
content and form (e.g. a standalone report). This should ensure CSR disclosure comparability, 
but more importantly, firm accountability to all stakeholders, thereby enhancing trust and 
facilitating the shared values on which to build a more cohesive society. Second, our results 
shed additional light on the positive effects of foreign ownership on the likelihood of CSR 
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disclosure. Chinese policy-makers may consider allowing more QFIIs into the domestic 
securities market to facilitate socially responsible investments. Third, Chinese firms should 
provide greater CSR training to their managers, accountants and auditors. 
   Our study also has some practical implications. First, our results confirm that different 
owners may have divergent and even competing perspectives on CSR. Understanding this 
should help corporate managers to recognise how particular types of shareholders will value 
their efforts regarding CSR activities and disclosure; therefore improving corporate responses 
to those shareholders through CSR goal congruence. Second, our study should provide some 
guidance to help Chinese listed firms to direct their efforts more effectively by, for example, 
disclosing more CSR information when attempting to attract QFIIs or long-term investors.  
   Our results should nevertheless be interpreted with a degree of caution. First, the single 
year dataset employed may somewhat restrict the generalisation of our findings. Second, this 
study makes the simplifying assumption that CSR engagement and CSR disclosure are 
synonymous. Third, our study examines the causal effects of ownership on the likelihood of 
CSR disclosure, though CSR performance itself is not measured. Finally, while the study 
examines how ownership impacts upon CSR disclosure, it may also be insightful to 
understand how CSR disclosure is affected by other stakeholders, such as customers and the 
accounting profession.  
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NOTES: 
 
 
1
 The two stock exchanges require that SZSE 100 Index component firms, SSE Corporate Governance Index 
firms, and SSE firms listed overseas must provide a CSR report. 
2
 Two additional models examine the impact of managerial ownership on the likelihood of CSR disclosure 
where the percentage of shares owned by directors and senior managers is employed to measure managerial 
ownership. However, the unreported results are insignificant and do not alter the results for the other variables, 
indicating that managerial ownership has little impact on the CSR disclosure in China.   
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Table 1: The proportion of firms publishing a CSR report by the CSRC industry classification 
 Industry No. of 
CSR 
report 
firms 
No. of 
Non-
CSR 
firms 
Total 
number 
of firms 
Per cent 
of CSR 
report 
firms (%) 
1 Agriculture, forestry, livestock farming and 
fishery 
7 28 35 20% 
2 Mining 22 23 45 49% 
3 Manufacturing 263 902 1165 23% 
4 Electric power, gas and water production and 
supply 
27 42 69 39% 
5 Construction 11 28 39 28% 
6 Wholesale and retail trade 24 80 104 23% 
7 Transport, storage and postal service 32 40 72 44% 
8 Accommodation and catering 1 8 9 11% 
9 Information transmission, software and 
information technology services 
17 70 87 20% 
10 Real estate 32 80 112 29% 
11 Leasing and commercial service 3 19 22 14% 
12 Scientific research and technical service 1 8 9 11% 
13 Water conservancy, environment and public 
facility management 
4 4 8 50% 
14 Resident service, repair and other services 1 6 7 14% 
15 Health and social service 1 1 2 50% 
16 Culture, sports and entertainment 1 10 11 9% 
17 Diversified 12 31 43 28% 
 Total 459 1380 1839 25% 
Note: The labels CSR report firms and Non-CSR report firms correspond to the number of firms publishing a CSR report and 
those which do not, classified by the 2012 CSRC industry classification code. Total number of firms corresponds to the total 
number of firms in each industry class. Percentage of CSR firms is the Number of CSR report firms divided by the Total 
number of firms for each industry. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlations for the model variables  
Variable 
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 CSRRP 0.25 0.43            
2 SIZE  21.78 1.24 0.45           
3 ROA  0.05 0.05 0.12 0.03          
4 LEVERAGE  0.43 0.22 0.16 0.49 -0.41         
5 OWNCON  15.39 31.93 0.02 0.15 -0.11 0.17        
6 SSE  0.42 0.49 0.19 0.34 -0.11 0.34 0.17       
7 SE 0.18 0.38 0.72 0.51 0.07 0.19 0.07 0.29      
8 SOE 0.50 0.50 0.20 0.39 -0.14 0.37 0.19 0.35 0.27     
9 MF (%) 3.32 4.23 0.09 0.02 0.23 -0.01 -0.16 0.00 0.07 -0.03    
10 INSUR (%) 0.40 1.11 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.12   
11 NSSF (%) 0.35 0.88 0.01 0.03 0.11 -0.07 -0.10 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.14 0.04  
12 FOREIGN (%) 0.11 0.43 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.05 -0.01 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.04 0.02 
Note: N = 1,839.  When the absolute value of a correlation coefficient is greater than or equal to 0.06, it is significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 3: Probit models of the likelihood of firm CSR report publication 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Control variables 
  SIZE 0.289*** 0.286*** 0.284*** 0.296*** 0.297*** 0.300*** 0.298*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
  ROA 3.401*** 3.447*** 3.659*** 3.257*** 3.147*** 3.006*** 3.195*** 
 (1.052) (1.057) (1.060) (1.100) (1.103) (1.104) (1.107) 
  LEVERAGE -0.047 -0.064 -0.020 -0.098 -0.120 -0.152 -0.107 
 (0.268) (0.270) (0.272) (0.274) (0.275) (0.276) (0.277) 
  OWNCON -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
  SSE -0.215*** -0.223** -0.208** -0.207** -0.218** -0.227** -0.213** 
 (0.077) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.100) (0.100) (0.101) 
  SE 2.448*** 2.445*** 2.037*** 2.454*** 2.459*** 2.459*** 2.055*** 
 (0.128) (0.125) (0.207) (0.126) (0.127) (0.127) (0.212) 
 
       
Shareholder variables 
  H1: SOE  0.046 -0.038 0.052 0.046 0.097 0.014 
  (0.097) (0.103) (0.098) (0.098) (0.101) (0.108) 
  H2: SOE × SE   0.589**    0.577** 
   (0.248)    (0.252) 
  H3: MF    0.007 0.005 0.006 0.006 
    (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
  H3: INSUR    -0.100* -0.104** -0.100* -0.094* 
    (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
  H4: NSSF    0.025 0.027 0.024 0.024 
    (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
  H5: FOREIGN     0.151* 0.384*** 0.374*** 
     (0.091) (0.142) (0.139) 
  H6: FOREIGN 
×SOE 
     -0.394** -0.386** 
      (0.189) (0.189) 
Intercept -7.485*** -7.432*** -7.365*** -7.654*** -7.656*** -7.758*** -7.672*** 
 (1.043) (1.049) (1.058) (1.064) (1.067) (1.070) (1.078) 
Pseudo R
2 
0.455 0.455 0.458 0.458 0.459 0.461 0.464 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses; industry dummies are included, but not reported here. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
level, two-tailed coefficient test (N = 1,839). 
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